

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 13892 01 OF 05 281710Z

45

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SS-20 DRC-01 RSC-01

SSO-00 /058 W

----- 102419

P R 281654Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5900

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 13892

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ANNENBERG

E.O.11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, UK

SUBJECT: THE CHANGING ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

MINDFUL OF YOUR INJUNCTION TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE THAT

"I REQUIRE NOT ONLY INFORMATION ON WHAT IS HAPPENING,

BUT YOUR MOST THOUGHTFUL AND CAREFUL ANALYSES OF WHY IT

IS HAPPENING, WHAT IT MEANS FOR US POLICY, AND THE

DIRECTION IN WHICH YOU SEE EVENTS GOING", I RESPECTFULLY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 13892 01 OF 05 281710Z

SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

RELATIONSHIP. I HOPE YOU WILL HAVE THE TIME TO READ THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH RECENT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE BROUGHT INTO SHARP RELIEF.

1. INTRODUCTION

THE "SPECIAL" QUALITY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN MORE APPARENT THAN REAL FOR SOME TIME. DIVERSE FORCES HAVE PROGRESSIVELY WORN DOWN THE STRUCTURE AND MODIFIED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONNECTION. BUT THE OCTOBER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST DRAMATICALLY REVEALED THE DIMENSION OF THE CHANGE AND SURFACED DIVERGENCES WHICH HAD LARGELY REMAINED OUTSIDE PUBLIC SCRUTINY.

BY THE LATE 1960'S THE UNITED KINGDOM NO LONGER ENJOYED THE PARAMOUNTCY IT HAD ONCE HAD IN WASHINGTON. AND IN LONDON, US VIEWS NO LONGER NATURALLY ASSUMED FIRST PLACE IN BRITISH CALCULATIONS. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL CONCERN IN BOTH COUNTRIES FOR THE GOOD OPINION OF THE OTHER AND MANY MUTUAL INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY WESTERN SECURITY, STRONG COUNTERVAILING INFLUENCES HAD BEGUN TO OPERATE ON BOTH COUNTRIES: ON BRITAIN, TOWARD EUROPE; ON THE UNITED STATES, TOWARD A NEW COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION PREDICATED ON A MUTUAL INTEREST IN REDUCING AND ELIMINATING THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR. THESE INFLUENCES HAVE INTRODUCED COMPLEXITIES INTO ANGLO-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEMANDING NEW APPROACHES TO THE CONDUCT OF THE RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, THE FOUNDATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP EXPRESSED IN THE WIDEST RANGE OF ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL INTERCOURSE IS STRONG. A DEEP COMMUNITY OF INTEREST PERSISTS.

2. THE 1970 ELECTION - NEW DIRECTIONS IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.

WHEN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY WAS RETURNED TO POWER IN 1970 IT ADOPTED A FOREIGN POLICY WHICH SHOWED A SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE WORLD, A SOBER APPRECIATION OF BRITAIN'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 13892 01 OF 05 281710Z

DIMINISHED INTERNATIONAL STANDING AND A COMPULSIVE DRIVE TO ACHIEVE A NEW PLACE FOR BRITAIN. FROM THE FIRST, PRIME MINISTER HEATH ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO FOLLOW A MORE CONSCIOUSLY "BRITAIN FIRST" POLICY THAN HIS PREDECESSORS. AS HE PUT IT IN 1970: "THE TIME HAS COME TO ESTABLISH THAT BRITISH POLICIES ARE DETERMINED BY BRITISH INTERESTS." FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN SINCE 1970 ATTEST TO THE SINGULAR

SENSE OF PURPOSE WITH WHICH IT HAS PURSUED BRITISH
INTERESTS HOWEVER UNPOPULAR ITS ACTIONS MAY HAVE BEEN
AT TIMES WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

HEATH IS THE ARCHITECT OF BRITISH POLICY IN ALL
ITS DIMENSIONS. UNSENTIMENTAL ABOUT ANGLO-AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIPS, HE HAS (UNLIKE FOREIGN SECRETARY
DOUGLAS-HOME) A STRAIN OF ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING. HE IS

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 13892 02 OF 05 281715Z

45

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SS-20 DRC-01 RSC-01

SSO-00 /058 W

----- 102496

P R 281654Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5901

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 13892

FOR THE SECRETARY

A KIND OF BRITISH GAULLIST WITH A BIAS TOWARD FRANCE AND A RECEPTIVITY TO LONG-STANDING FRENCH ARGUMENTS THAT IN THE END EUROPE MUST STRIVE TO DEPEND ON NO ONE BUT ITSELF. HIS GOVERNMENT IS THE FIRST SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR WITH NO VESTED INTEREST IN THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP", AND NO COMPULSION TO CONSIDER THAT AMERICAN APPROBATION CONFERS SPECIAL DISTINCTION. MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS, FROM THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 13892 02 OF 05 281715Z

FIRST, ONE OF HIS CARDINAL TENETS AND IN A PERSONAL SENSE HE SEES HIMSELF CAST IN THE ROLE OF ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF A NEW EUROPE. IN COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP HEATH SEES THE PROMISE OF FULFILLMENT OF BRITAIN'S NATIONAL DESTINY AND A SPUR TO THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL; AND IN THE FIRST YEAR OF MEMBERSHIP THE UK HAS UNHESITATINGLY USED ITS INFLUENCE TO PROD THE EC INTO GIVING MUCH MORE CONSIDERATION TO THE EFFECTS OF ITS ECONOMIC POLICIES ON THE OUTSIDE WORLD. AS A RESULT, US INTERESTS HAVE BEEN HELPED AND PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED US-EC RELATIONS ARE GOOD.

THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT'S HEAVY COMMITMENT TO EUROPE IS, HOWEVER, BALANCED (UNEASILY AT TIMES) BY A STRONG COMMITMENT TO ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP. IN NATO, IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND IN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NINE THE BRITISH BELIEVE THAT IN GENERAL THEY HAVE SUCCESSFULLY SQUARED THEIR EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS WITH ATLANTIC INTERESTS.

ABOUT A YEAR AFTER THE CONSERVATIVES CAME TO OFFICE TWO EVENTS OCCURRED WHICH RAISED QUESTIONS IN LONDON ABOUT THE CONSTANCY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. THE US ECONOMIC MEASURES OF AUGUST 1971 AND THE DRAMATIC AMERICAN OPENING OF CONTACT WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, DECISIONS TAKEN WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION IN FIELDS OF FIRST IMPORTANCE TO BRITAIN, BROUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT (AND HEATH PERSONALLY) UP SHARPLY. THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD IMPERATIVE REASONS FOR SECRECY AND SPEED WAS OF LESS SIGNIFICANCE TO THE HEATH GOVERNMENT THAN THE FACT THAT WE HAD DONE SO WITHOUT APPARENT REGARD FOR BRITISH INTERESTS OR SENSIBILITIES.

THE OPENING IN 1972 OF A NEW PHASE IN THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP CAUSED LESS ANXIETY IN LONDON THAN IN SOME OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS; HERE IT WAS GENUINELY RECEIVED AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO LESS

PERILOUS EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SALT AGREEMENTS,
ESPECIALLY THE ABM AGREEMENT WHICH HAD SPECIAL
RELEVANCE TO THE LONGEVITY OF BRITAIN'S OWN NUCLEAR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 13892 02 OF 05 281715Z

FORCE, WERE A WELCOME OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT.
AND AS THE US-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT QUICKENED, THE
UNITED KINGDOM CONTINUED TO LOOK ON IT POSITIVELY.
IN FACT, THEY ACTIVELY TRIED TO CONVINCE SOME OF THEIR
MORE WORRIED EUROPEAN FRIENDS OF THE MERITS OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. BUT IN
LONDON, AS ON THE CONTINENT, QUESTIONS BEGAN TO BE
ASKED ABOUT WHAT THE NEW DIRECTION IN US-SOVIET
RELATIONSHIPS MEANT FOR WESTERN EUROPE. WHILE THE
BRITISH ACCEPTED THAT THIS US POLICY WAS NOT INHERENTLY
INIMICAL TO EUROPEAN INTERESTS, THERE IS AMPLE
EVIDENCE THAT THEY BEGAN SERIOUSLY TO THINK AHEAD TO A
TIME (POSSIBLY NOT TOO DISTANT) WHEN SUPER-POWER
CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT LOOSEN US TIES WITH EUROPE, AND
EUROPE ITSELF WOULD HAVE TO TRY IN EARNEST TO ACHIEVE A
MORE COHERENT POLITICAL AND DEFENSE POSTURE.

A PASSAGE OF ARMS OVER MBFR UNDERSCORED DIVERGENT
PERCEPTIONS OR AT LEAST DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 13892 03 OF 05 281720Z

45

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SS-20 DRC-01 RSC-01

SSO-00 /058 W

----- 102532

P R 281654Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5902

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 13892

FOR THE SECRETARY

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN MATTERS AFFECTING WESTERN SECURITY. THE BRITISH APPROACHED MBFR WITH A MIXTURE OF GRAVE MISGIVING AND A DISPOSITION TO ASSIST THE US GOVERNMENT (WITHIN DISCREET LIMITS) TO FEND OFF DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR UNILATERAL TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE. BUT A CENTRAL CONSIDERATION BEHIND THEIR CRITICAL APPROACH WAS CONCERN FOR THE POTENTIALLY DEBILITATING EFFECT MBFR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 13892 03 OF 05 281720Z

OUTCOMES COULD HAVE ON THE BRITISH OBJECTIVE OF DEVELOPING MEANINGFUL EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND QUESTIONING OF EACH OTHER'S MOTIVES CONTRIBUTED TO WIDELY DIVERGENT POSITIONS WHICH ONLY CLOSE AND PROTRACTED CONSULTATION FINALLY ACCOMMODATED, LARGELY DUE TO BRITISH REALIZATION THAT THEIR OSTENSIBLY SPOILING ROLE WAS PRODUCING UNACCEPTABLE STRAINS IN OVERALL US-UK RELATIONS.

THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 23 SPEECH PRESENTED A DILEMMA FOR THE BRITISH. THE INSTINCT OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY, AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY DID SO ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IN A MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENT. BUT THE BRITISH WERE ACUTELY AWARE OF THE FORMATIVE STATE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATION, THE INSTITUTIONAL INADEQUACIES OF THE NINE AND THE NEGATIVISM OF FRANCE -- ALL OF WHICH MADE IT CLEAR TO LONDON THAT THE ENTERPRISE COULD ADVANCE WITH NO MORE THAN DELIBERATE

SPEED AND THAT ANY DOCUMENT EXPRESSING US-EC RELATIONSHIPS WAS UNLIKELY TO BE AS COMPREHENSIVE, PRECISE OR PARTNERSHIP-ORIENTED AS THE UNITED STATES HOPED. IN THE EVENT, THE BRITISH PROFESSED TO BELIEVE THAT THE FORM AND CONTENT OF A US-EC DOCUMENT WERE LESS IMPORTANT THAN PRAGMATIC CONCENTRATION NOW AND IN FUTURE ON DEVELOPING THE RELATIONSHIP. THEY SEEMED TO BE PREPARED TO WATER DOWN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP CONCEPTS (TO WHICH THEY DO ATTACH HIGH VALUE) IN DEFERENCE TO EUROPEAN CONSIDERATIONS, AND THUS APPEARED (CONTRARY TO THEIR WISH) TO BE AS GRUDGING AS THE OTHER EUROPEANS.

3. THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

BEFORE WAR BROKE OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN OCTOBER, US-UK RELATIONS SEEMED TO BE ON A MORE OR LESS EVEN KEEL, ALTHOUGH TENSIONS CREATED BY SUCH ISSUES AS MBFR AND THE US-EC DECLARATION WERE NOT FAR BELOW THE SURFACE.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE BEEN AT VARIANCE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 13892 03 OF 05 281720Z

PARTICULARLY SINCE 1970 WHEN THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT FORMALLY ADOPTED A POSTURE WHICH LEANED TOWARD THE ARAB CAUSE. AT BOTTOM, OUR DIFFERENCES WERE MORE OVER TACTICS THAN FUNDAMENTALS, FOR THE BRITISH SHARE WITH US A DESIRE TO SEE AN EQUITABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION IN WHICH THE INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL AND THE RIGHTS OF THE ARABS ARE SAFEGUARDED. HOWEVER, THE BRITISH HAVE LONG BEEN CONVINCED THAT THE US COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL WAS SO OPEN-ENDED THAT IT GAVE INSUFFICIENT INCENTIVE TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 - A PREREQUISITE IN BRITISH MINDS TO THE START OF ANY MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THE BRITISH THEREFORE (LIKE THE FRENCH AND OTHER EUROPEANS WITH WHOM THE BRITISH HAVE INCREASINGLY FELT THEY HAD TO HARMONIZE THEIR POLICIES INCLUDING THAT TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST), HAVE LOOKED TO THE UNITED STATES TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO MAKE THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE. FURTHERMORE, SINCE 1967 THE BRITISH HAVE ENGAGED IN ACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE ARAB WORLD TO REFURBISH POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS, EXPAND COMMERCIAL TIES, SELL ARMS AND ENSURE THE CONTINUED FLOW OF OIL. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN MOTIVATED BY THE CONVICTION THAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE CAN OFFER THE ARABS ALTERNATIVES TO THE SOVIET UNION AND, TO A DEGREE, TO THE UNITED STATES AS WELL.

CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS THESE SHAPED THE
NEUTRALITY WHICH THE UK ADOPTED DURING THE RECENT
MIDDLE EAST WAR - A POLICY WHICH THEY CONSIDERED
CALCULATED TO PROTECT THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
(THEY RATIONALIZED) TO PROMOTE A PEACE SETTLEMENT.
FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS DID NOT,
AT THE OUTSET ANYWAY, APPEAR TO BE THE TEST OF THE
VIABILITY OF THE STRUCTURE OF WORLD PEACE IN THE SENSE
THAT IT WAS TO THE UNITED STATES, ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 13892 04 OF 05 281725Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SS-20 DRC-01 RSC-01

SSO-00 /058 W

----- 102592

P R 281654Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5903

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 13892

FOR THE SECRETARY

DID ON REPEATED OCCASIONS FIRMLY WARN THE RUSSIANS OF THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES THEIR ADVENTURISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD HAVE ON EAST-WEST DETENTE.

THE BRITISH WERE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO REGARD THE ISSUES AT STAKE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS JUSTIFYING A COLLECTIVE NATO RESPONSE. BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE NOT, THEY CONTENDED, IDENTICAL TO SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 13892 04 OF 05 281725Z

THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES, EXCEPT IN THE SENSE OF SEEING THAT A STABLE PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED.

THE POSITION THE BRITISH TOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, WHATEVER ITS SUBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION, HAS RESULTED IN THEIR BEING EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDED FROM THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS, AT LEAST AT THIS TIME. WHILE THEY APPEAR RESIGNED TO THIS FACT, IT HAS SPURRED THEM TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH THE EC NINE TO FORMULATE JOINT POLICIES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH IN TIME MAY GIVE BRITAIN AND THE NINE MORE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. TEMPORARILY BRITISH MIDDLE EAST POLICY HAS SAFEGUARDED BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND PERHAPS GIVEN THEM A PRIVILEGED POSITION ON OIL. WHAT OTHER BENEFITS IT HAS GAINED THEM, OR HOW LONG THEIR OSTENSIBLY FAVORED POSITION ON OIL (WHICH IS SPECIAL ONLY IN A RELATIVE SENSE) WILL LAST IS OPEN TO QUESTION.

4. THE FUTURE OF THE US-UK CONNECTION.

ALTHOUGH THE EXTENT OF US-UK DIFFERENCES OVER THE MIDDLE EAST AND CRITICISMS LEVELED AT THEM BY THE UNITED STATES SURPRISED, SHOCKED AND EMBITTERED THE BRITISH, THE GOVERNMENT HAS PUBLICLY MINIMIZED THE STRAINS ON THE ALLIANCE AND INSTEAD EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO AND OF PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. AS THE PRIME MINISTER RECENTLY STATED: "THE ESSENTIAL PRIORITIES HAVE NOT CHANGED. THE NEED FOR AN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP DEDICATED TO THE COMMON DEFENSE REMAINS AS NECESSARY AS EVER. IN THAT PARTNERSHIP THE UNITED STATES REMAINS, OF COURSE, BY FAR THE LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL OF THE PARTNERS."

THE BRITISH REALIZE THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ONLY THE UNITED STATES CAN ENSURE THAT THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS SAFELY MANAGED AND THAT THE

CONSOLIDATION OF WESTERN EUROPE (LONG A PROFESSED US GOAL) DEVELOPS IN AN ORDERLY WAY WITHOUT PRESSURE OR INTERFERENCE FROM THE EAST. THE BRITISH HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT HOW LITTLE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT THEY OR THE EUROPEANS WOULD HAVE IF US-EUROPEAN TIES WERE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 13892 04 OF 05 281725Z

FUNDAMENTALLY WEAKENED; FOR THEY ARE APPREHENSIVE OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIAN READINESS TO CAJOLE WESTERN EUROPE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE COUNTER-WEIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS HOW LASTING THE EFFECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND THE ACCUMULATED IRRITANTS OF THE PAST YEAR WILL BE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION IS HOW TO CLEAR THE ATMOSPHERE OF MISUNDERSTANDING. THERE ARE NO EASY PRESCRIPTIONS, BUT ACTING ON A FEW CLEAR GUIDELINES COULD HAVE A PROFOUNDLY BENEFICIAL EFFECT.

FIRST, BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IN SOME AREAS OUTSIDE NATO EUROPE (THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE MOST PERTINENT) WE ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO HAVE DIFFERENCES AND POSSIBLY CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THAT WE WILL HAVE TO WORK PARTICULARLY HARD TO ACCOMMODATE DIVERGENCES. NEXT, AND OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP OUR CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION CLEAR. DOING SO IS AS MUCH A QUESTION OF STYLE AND TECHNIQUE AS SUBSTANCE. SINCE THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO ATTACH A HIGH VALUE TO THE SUPPORT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES CAN GIVE OUR POLICIES IN THE AREA OF FIRST IMPORTANCE TO US BOTH - EUROPE - WE SHOULD TAKE DUE ACCOUNT OF THE SENSIBILITIES OF THE BRITISH AND THE OTHER EUROPEANS. BRITAIN IN THE 1970'S IS STILL ACUTELY SENSITIVE TO ITS LOST POWER AND INFLUENCE; INTELLECTUALLY IT ACCEPTS THE REALITY OF MEDIUM POWER STATUS BUT EMOTIONALLY IT IS STILL IN THE THROES OF ADJUSTMENT. THE BRITISH THEREFORE STILL BELIEVE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO A SPECIAL MEASURE OF CONSULTATION AND CONFIDENCE. WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXPECT SIMILAR CANDOR AND RESPONSIVENESS. BRITAIN'S VOCATION IN EUROPE AND THE WIDER GREAT POWER RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNITED

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 13892 05 OF 05 281724Z

45

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SS-20 DRC-01 RSC-01

SSO-00 /058 W

----- 102629

P R 281654Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5904

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 13892

FOR THE SECRETARY

STATES WILL GO ON OPERATING TO DIVEST THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP OF THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH HAVE DISTINGUISHED IT FOR SO LONG. BUT A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN SAFEGUARDING WESTERN VALUES AND PROMOTING THE WELFARE OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY REMAINS. AS THE DOMINANT PARTNER, IT SEEMS INCUMBENT ON THE UNITED STATES TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO SEE THAT THE US-UK DIALOGUE AND THE DIALOGUE WITH WESTERN EUROPE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 13892 05 OF 05 281724Z

BECOMES INTENSE AND UNINTERRUPTED. FINALLY, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TRY TO AVOID SPRINGING SURPRISES OR SUDDEN DEPARTURES IN POLICY. THE BRITISH WILL RESPECT AND IN MANY CASES PROBABLY SUPPORT US POLICIES IF WE FIRST SERIOUSLY SOLICIT THEIR UNDERSTANDING. IF WE DO NOT DO SO, WE CAN EXPECT ONLY A CONFUSED RESPONSE AND RESISTANCE.

AT THIS WRITING BRITISH NERVES ARE STILL FRAYED. THAT THIS MAY BE DUE TO THEIR OWN DEFENSIVE AND, ARGUABLY, SELFISH RESPONSE TO A DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD NOT DISCOURAGE THE UNITED STATES FROM SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WILL BE PRESENTED IN DECEMBER TO RESTORE A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE, PURPOSE AND PROPORTION IN US-UK AND US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS.

ANNENBERG

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PERSONAL OPINION, FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, FOREIGN COMMITMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: mcintyresh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973LONDON13892
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: LONDON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t1973118/aaaaafl.tel
Line Count: 618
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: mcintyresh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16-Jul-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <27-Aug-2001 by mcintyresh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANGLO AMERICAN RELATIONS
TAGS: PFOR, UK, (ANNENBERG)
To: n/a
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005